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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
DIAMOND, District Judge.
3Torrey Real appeals from the District Court’s denial of
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We
granted a certificate of appealability to consider whether Real’s
trial counsel was ineffective.  For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.  
I.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II.
On February 4, 1999, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania charged Appellant with rape, statutory sexual
assault, aggravated indecent assault, and corruption of a minor,
alleging that Real attacked a twelve-year-old girl in January
1999.  On March 18, 1999, Real was also charged with rape and
corruption of a minor for attacking a fifteen-year-old girl “on or
about December 1996.”  The victims in these prosecutions were
stepsisters.  The two cases were consolidated, and trial was
scheduled for May 2000 in the York County Common Pleas
Court.   
In a letter dated December 23, 1999, Real’s trial counsel
notified the prosecutor and the court that he intended to present
military records to establish an alibi for Real with respect to the
1996 rape.  See Pa. R. Crim. P. 567 (“A defendant who intends
to offer the defense of alibi at trial shall file with the clerk of
courts . . . a notice specifying an intention to offer an alibi
defense, and shall serve a copy of the notice . . . on the attorney
for the Commonwealth.”). 
4At trial, the 1996 victim (“B.B.”) testified that although
she was not certain, she believed that Real assaulted her
sometime between November and December 1996. Counsel did
not object to this testimony, even though it was arguably
inconsistent with the criminal information charging Real, which
stated that the attack occurred “on or about December 1996.”
Rather, defense counsel sought to establish that: (1) both victims
had colluded to make false charges against Real; and (2) Real
had an alibi – military service – for most of November and
December 1996.  Accordingly, counsel vigorously cross-
examined B.B., suggesting that her inability to remember the
date of the assault was not credible.  Counsel also presented
records showing that Real traveled to South Carolina on
November 18, 1996 to begin U.S. Army service and did not
return to York until February 1997.  Real testified to these same
facts.   
In their closings, the prosecutor and defense counsel
sought to characterize the evidence to their advantage.  The
prosecutor argued that in light of B.B.’s testimony that the rape
might have occurred in November, Real’s alibi defense – which
covered the period beginning November 18th – was incomplete.
Defense counsel argued that Real could not have attacked B.B.
because he was performing military service.  Counsel also told
that jury that B.B. was not credible, especially because she could
not recall the date and circumstances of the attack. 
The trial court later charged the jury that
in regards to [B.B.], her testimony was she
believed [the rape] occurred during the period
November, December 1996, although she was not
5certain of the exact date and, of course, that whole
issue as to when it occurred, if you determine that
it did occur, and the alibi defense.  All of that you
will have to reconcile and measure. 
But the point here is that you are not bound by any
particular or specific date.  It is not an essential
element of the crime or crimes charged.  You may
find the Defendant guilty if you are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the
crime charged even though you’re not satisfied that
he committed it on a particular day or at the
particular time alleged in the charging documents.
(App. at 87.)  Trial counsel did not object to these instructions.
On May 10, 2000, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all
but one charge: corruption of a minor in connection with the
1996 attack.  On June 19, 2000, the trial court sentenced Real to
an aggregate term of ten to twenty years imprisonment.  The
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied allocatur.  See Commonwealth v. Real,
792 A.2d 1286 (Pa. Super. 2001), appeal denied, 831 A.2d 599
(Pa. 2003).    
On November 28, 2004, Real filed a timely pro se
petition in state court under the Post Conviction Relief Act.  42
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541.  The PCRA Court subsequently
appointed counsel, who contended, inter alia, that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to object to: (1) B.B.’s testimony that
she was raped in November or December 1996, even though the
6information stated that the rape occurred “on or about December
1996”; and (2) the trial court’s alibi instruction.  Following an
evidentiary hearing, the PCRA Court denied relief on June 6,
2005, and Real appealed to the Superior Court. 
On appeal, Real reiterated his contention that trial
counsel ineffectively failed to raise the purported variance
between the criminal information and B.B.’s testimony.  Relying
on Commonwealth v. Devlin, the Superior Court affirmed.  333
A.2d 888 (Pa. 1975).  In Devlin, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the Commonwealth is required to prove the date
on which a crime was committed only to a “reasonable
certainty,” even when the defendant presents an alibi defense.
Id. at 891.  The Devlin Court did not create a single test for
determining when a variance as to the date of the charged
offense might be impermissible, noting instead that “[a]ny
leeway permissible [must] vary with the nature of the crime and
the age and condition of the victim, balanced against the rights
of the accused.”  Id. at 892.  Applying this test to Real’s case,
the Superior Court balanced the serious nature of the crimes
charged, B.B.’s age, and the time that had passed between the
attack and B.B.’s testimony against Real’s due process rights,
concluding that “the variance between the allegations in the
criminal information and the proof adduced during trial was
reasonable . . . .”  (App. at 38.)  Accordingly, the Court ruled
that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a
meritless variance objection to B.B.’s testimony. 
The Court similarly rejected Real’s contentions
respecting trial counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s
instructions:
7The record supports the PCRA court’s
determination that the trial court properly advised
the jury to consider [Real’s] alibi defense along
with all of the other evidence in determining
whether the Commonwealth satisfied its burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [Real]
committed the offenses charged.  Thus, when read
in its entirety, the court’s jury instruction clearly,
adequately, and accurately reflected the law.  As
such, [Real’s] ineffective assistance of counsel
claim lacks arguable merit.
(Id. at 39-40.)  Rejecting Real’s remaining claims on April 19,
2006, the Superior Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief. 
On April 20, 2007, Real, again acting pro se, sought
habeas corpus relief in the District Court, alleging that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) seek a severance with
respect to the 1996 and 1999 attacks; (2) object to the purported
variance between B.B.’s testimony and the criminal information;
and (3) object to the trial court’s jury instruction.  28 U.S.C. §
2254.
On October 29, 2007, the District Court denied relief,
concluding that the Superior Court’s adjudication of Real’s
claims did not “result[] in a decision that was contrary to, or
involve[] an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  The District Court also
found no basis for the issuance of a certificate of appealability.
On December 3, 2007, Real filed a Notice of Appeal,
along with an Application for a Certificate of Appealability.  On
February 7, 2008, we granted Real a certificate of appealability
8to consider whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to: (1) the variance between B.B.’s testimony and the
criminal information; and (2) the trial court’s instruction
regarding Real’s alibi defense.  
III.
Because the District Court denied Real’s petition without
conducting an evidentiary hearing, our review of the District
Court’s decision is plenary.  Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 99 (3d
Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).  Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, we apply the same
standards as the District Court: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim – 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d
36, 50 (3d Cir. 2002).  
9Real does not challenge the state courts’ factual
determinations.  Rather, he contends that the Superior Court’s
rejection of his claims “resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law,” and that he is thus “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.”  28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), (d).  We do not agree.   
A.
Real argues first that his trial counsel should have raised
the variance between B.B.’s testimony and the criminal
information.  To determine whether a variance violates the
Constitution, federal courts look to “whether or not there has
been prejudice to the defendant,” focusing on the defendant’s
right to notice and his ability to defend himself at trial.  United
States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1497 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). 
The true inquiry . . . is whether there has been
such a variance as to “affect the substantial
rights” of the accused.  The general rule that
allegations and proof must correspond is based
upon the obvious requirements (1) that the
accused shall be definitely informed as to the
charges against him, so that he may be enabled to
present his defense and not be taken by surprise
by the evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that he
may be protected against another prosecution for
the same offense. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (U.S. 1935) (internal
citations omitted).
Accordingly, a variance violates the Constitution “only
if it is likely to have surprised or otherwise has prejudiced the
defense.”  United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir.
2006) (citing United States v. Schurr, 775 F.2d 549, 553-54 (3d
10
Cir. 1985)).  Insofar as the Devlin test applied by the Superior
Court requires courts to balance the rights of the accused against
“the nature of the crime and the age and condition of the
victim,” this test is incompatible with federal law.  Devlin is
“contrary to” Berger and related federal decisions, which focus
exclusively on whether a variance violates the defendant’s due
process rights.  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405
(2000) (“A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to our
clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases.”).
The Superior Court’s error, however, does not, by itself,
warrant the granting of habeas relief.  Rather, where a state
prisoner “surmount[s] 2254(d)’s bar to habeas relief” by
showing that the state court’s decision is “contrary to” federal
law, the federal courts must review the prisoner’s claim de novo
under the correct federal standard.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 542 (2003) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 393-94, 397, 412).
Applying that standard, we do not believe the “variance”
between B.B.’s testimony and the information violated Real’s
due process rights.  The information stated that B.B.’s rape
occurred “on or about December 1996.”  “Where ‘on or about’
language is used, the government is not required to prove the
exact dates, if a date reasonably near is established.”  United
States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1323 (2d Cir. 1987); accord
United States v. Benson, 591 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Mata, 491 F.3d 237, 243 (5th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Reed, 887 F.2d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Leibowitz, 857 F.2d 373, 379 (7th Cir. 1988).
Our sister Circuits have held that where, as here, the
government’s evidence proves that an offense was committed
within a month of the month specified in an “on or about”
indictment or information, the “reasonably near” requirement is
satisfied.  See, e.g., United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 698
n.7 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The indictment’s specification of
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possession ‘on or about’ March 1995 reasonably encompasses
criminal conduct in April 1995.”); United States v. Barsanti, 943
F.2d 428, 438-39 (4th Cir. 1991) (variance of four months did
not prejudice the defendant); Nersesian, 824 F.2d at 1323 (“In
our view, the government’s argument that the date of the actual
transaction was possibly July or early August was not an
improper material variance from the ‘on or about June 1984’
date charged in the indictment.”); cf. United States v. Ross, 412
F.3d 771, 775 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Four years isn’t ‘reasonably
near.’”).  Accordingly, in charging that the 1996 rape took place
“on or about December,” the Commonwealth necessarily
charged that the attack may have occurred in November or
January as well.  In these circumstances, there was no variance
between B.B.’s testimony and the information, and no violation
of Real’s due process rights. 
Moreover, Real has not shown prejudice: trial counsel did
not testify at the PCRA hearing that he was surprised by B.B.’s
testimony, nor has Real explained how his defense would have
been different had the information explicitly stated that the rape
occurred in November or December 1996.  For this reason as
well, we do not believe that the difference between the
information and B.B.’s testimony violated Real’s federal due
process rights.  See United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 746
(3d Cir. 1974) (variance not unconstitutional unless defendant
was “so surprised by the proof adduced that he was unable to
prepare his defense adequately”); cf. Kokotan v. United States,
408 F.2d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 1969) (no prejudice to defendant
where proof at trial was within weeks of the specific “on or
about” date charged in the indictment).  Accordingly, trial
counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless due
process objection to the variance between the information and
B.B.’s testimony.  See Parrish v. Fulcomer, 150 F.3d 326, 328
(3d Cir. 1998) (counsel not ineffective for failing to raise a
meritless argument). 
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B.
Real also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the trial court’s alibi instruction.  In Real’s
view, the instruction: (1) did not comport with due process
because it “did not clarify for the jury that, in light of [Real’s]
alibi defense, time was of the essence”; and (2) contravened
Pennsylvania law, which provides that the alleged date of
occurrence is an essential element of the underlying crime where
the defendant presents an alibi.  (Appellant’s Br. at 45, 48.)  We
do not agree. 
“Habeas relief for a due process violation concerning an
absent or defective jury instruction is available only when the
absence of an instruction, or a defective instruction, infects the
entire trial with unfairness.”  Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103,
129 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147
(1973)); see also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)
(an improper state court instruction warrants the granting of
habeas relief only upon a showing that “the ailing instruction by
itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction
violates due process, not merely [that] the instruction is
undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned”)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  “The burden
of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial
that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional
validity of a state court’s judgment is even greater than the
showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal.”  Id.
Although Real contends that his alibi defense made time
“essential and of the essence in the underlying case,” he offers
no supporting authority.  (Appellant’s Br. at 42.)  In fact, other
Circuits have expressly “rejected the contention that time
becomes a material element of a criminal offense merely
because the defense of alibi is advanced.”  United States v.
Creamer, 721 F.2d 342, 343 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing United
States v. King, 703 F.2d 119, 123-24 (5th Cir.1983)); see also
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United States v. Stuckey, 220 F.3d 976, 982 (8th Cir. 2000)
(“Time is not a material element of a criminal offense unless
made so by the statute creating the offense.”) (citations omitted).
In these circumstances, Real has failed to demonstrate that the
trial court’s instruction – which confirmed the Commonwealth’s
burden of presenting proof of Real’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt – “infect[ed] his entire trial with unfairness.”  Albrecht,
485 F.3d at 129; see also United States v. Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219,
1226 (3d Cir. 1995) (no due process violation where instruction,
“taken as a whole, adequately conveyed the concept of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt”).
Nor has Real shown that this instruction violated
Pennsylvania law.  As the Superior Court noted, the challenged
instruction parallels Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal
Jury Instruction 3.19, “Date of Crime: Proof of Date Alleged
Not Essential.”  The Superior Court further observed that
Pennsylvania trial courts have “broad discretion in phrasing
[their] instructions so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and
accurately presented to the jury.”  (App. at 38) (citing
Commonwealth v. Miller, 746 A.2d 592, 604 (Pa. 2000)).  The
Court thus concluded that 
the trial court properly advised the jury to
consider [Real’s] alibi defense along with all of
the other evidence in determining whether the
Commonwealth satisfied is burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that [Real] committed
the offenses charged.  Thus, when read in its
entirety, the court’s jury instruction clearly,
adequately, and accurately reflected the law.  As
such, [Real’s] ineffective assistance of counsel
claim lacks arguable merit.  
(App. at 39-40.)  
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A federal court may re-examine a state court’s
interpretation of its own law only where this interpretation
“appears to be an obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of
a federal issue . . . .”  Hallowell v. Keve, 555 F.2d 103, 107 (3d
Cir. 1977) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Because there is nothing in the record to suggest that the
Superior Court was attempting “to evade consideration of a
federal issue,” we must accept that Court’s conclusion that the
trial court’s instruction was consistent with Pennsylvania law.
Id.  Having done so, we find no basis on which to conclude that
this instruction was improper, either under federal due process
standards or state law.  Accordingly, Real’s trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim, and the Superior
Court’s denial of PCRA relief was neither “contrary to, [n]or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Parrish, 150 F.3d
at 328 (counsel not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless
argument).   
IV.
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the
District Court.  
